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Abstract
We suggest a joint optimization model for a firm’s hedging and
leverage decisions that helps to establish an integrated frame-
work for value creation. Rather than artificially separating the
two interrelated parts of the firm’s financial policy, we treat
both corporate decision variables as endogenous. We argue
that exogenous differences between financial distress costs
across firms, and particularly across industries, simultaneous-
ly influence corporate risk management and capital structure
decisions. Using anecdotal evidence, our focus is not on so-
called direct bankruptcy costs, but rather on the cross-sec-
tional variation in indirect bankruptcy costs, which may result
from a deterioration of relationships with customers, suppli-
ers, or other stakeholders prior to the legal act of bankruptcy.
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1 This article is based on the authors’ more technical paper “Hedging, leverage, and
shareholder value: a testable theory of corporate risk management under general
distributional conditions.” We appreciate the valuable comments of Tim R. Adam,
Axel F. A. Adam-Müller, Amrit Judge, Olaf Korn, Gunter Löffler, Josef Zechner and
participants at the 5th Conference of the Swiss Society for Financial Market
Research (SGF), the 9th Annual Meeting of the German Finance Association (DGF),
the 2004 Basel Meeting of the European Financial Management Association
(EFMA), the 2005 WHU Campus for Finance Seminar and the 12th Global Finance
Conference in Dublin.
2 For example, Brealey, Myers and Allen (2005) state this hypothesis on their list of
the ten most important unsolved problems in finance that seem “ripe for produc-
tive research.”
3 See, for example, the recent work of Molina (2005), who concludes that his esti-
mation of the ex-ante costs of financial distress can offset the current estimates of
debt tax shields.
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From a managerial perspective, hedging market price risk
entails entering into selected derivative contracts, whose
state-dependent payments are intended to manipulate certain
features of the probability distribution of the firm’s future
cash flows or accounting earnings. Among the risk factors that
typically cause this type of undesirable volatility are interest
rates, foreign exchange rates, and the prices of commodities
like crude oil, fuel, or steel, which may constitute the firm’s
input factors or its products.
In general, corporate hedging can be defined as a reduction in
dependence between uncertain future corporate profits and
random market prices. Hence, speculative policies that
increase the firm’s exposure to price fluctuations, and that
might result from advantages in information about future
prices, are not considered here.
In the academic literature on corporate hedging, several theo-
ries offer competing answers to the questions of why and how
firms should hedge [Graham and Rogers (2002), Brown and
Toft (2002)]. Smith and Stulz (1985) deal with two value-
increasing effects of hedging, assuming a fixed capital struc-
ture. Firstly, they model the direct impact of hedging on corpo-
rate tax liability as a result of a convex tax function. Secondly,
they demonstrate its influence on the costs of financial distress
and bankruptcy: ‘By reducing the variability of the future value
of the firm, hedging lowers the probability of incurring bank-
ruptcy costs. This decrease in expected bankruptcy costs ben-
efits shareholders.’ Ignoring the issue of bankruptcy costs,
MacMinn (1987) suggests the protection of depreciation
charges and tax credits as a rationale for corporate hedging.
Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993) propose that hedging can
help to avoid the use of expensive external financing by coor-
dinating the firm’s investment and financing policy.
More recently, another line of reasoning that explicitly takes
the firm’s capital structure policy into account seems to be
gaining popularity. According to Ross (1996), Stulz (1996), and
Leland (1998), an important benefit of corporate hedging is
that it represents a means of taking advantage of increased
debt capacity and the resulting additional interest tax shield.
While this motive has already found its way into the finance
textbooks2, a clear-cut analytical model of the interaction
between the firm’s hedging and capital structure decisions has
been missing.
Financial distress costs and corporate taxes
constitute an optimal degree of leverage
From the famous Modigliani and Miller (1958) theorem it is
well known that value creation through financial decision mak-
ing at the company level requires the presence of certain mar-
ket frictions. In frictionless financial markets, not only a firm’s
capital structure decision, but also its hedging decision can be
regarded as irrelevant from the shareholders’ perspective. If,
for example, a company decides to buy an option for hedging
purposes and pays exactly its fair market value, there is no
value creation for shareholders in the first place. This is where
market frictions, such as bankruptcy costs, taxes, or transac-
tion costs come into play. These market imperfections can
turn the initially zero net present value of the derivatives con-
tract into a positive value contribution.
In the widely used trade-off model of a firm’s capital structure
[Kraus and Litzenberger (1973), Myers (1993)], which is still a
very popular prototype for practical applications [Opler, Saron
and Titman (1997)] and which seems to be about to undergo a
renaissance in financial theory3 as well, the optimum debt level
is obtained by minimizing the total present value of bankruptcy
costs and corporate taxes. However, of primary concern to us
are not the so-called direct bankruptcy costs, such as payments
to trustees, lawyers, courts, auctioneers, referees, appraisers,
or accountants, which are commonly modelled as a percentage
fraction of the remaining asset value. Instead, we assume that
there are substantial financial distress costs at a much earlier
stage, specifically whenever the corporate stakeholders notice
that the firm is facing some difficulty in meeting its obligations
to creditors and, correspondingly, adapt their behavior towards
the company. According to Smith and Stulz (1985) and Stulz
(1996), these costs, which are sometimes referred to as indirect
bankruptcy costs, are assumed to increase with the degree of
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corporate financial distress4. These costs may, for example,
arise from employees’ declining motivation or from sales being
lost to competitors, because customers become increasingly
reluctant to buy products that require repairs or other services
from a company that is on the verge of bankruptcy. Anecdotal
evidence of such behavior is provided, for example, by Rawls
and Smithson (1990), who report that when Wang Computers
got into financial trouble, sales fell and who cite a Wang cus-
tomer asking: ‘How do we know that in three years you won’t
be in Chapter 11?’
Shapiro and Titman (1985) give various other examples of
such indirect bankruptcy costs. They highlight the fact that
some firms are, by the very nature of their business, more vul-
nerable to adverse changes in their perceived distance to
default than other firms. For example, they cite Lee Iacocca’s
response to suggestions that Chrysler should declare bank-
ruptcy: ‘Our situation was unique… It wasn’t like the cereal
business. If Kellogg’s were known to be going out of business,
nobody would say: ‘Well, I won’t buy their cornflakes today.
What if I get stuck with a box of cereal and there’s nobody
around to service it?’ Hence, it is absolutely clear that finan-
cial distress costs resulting from a deterioration of customer
(or other stakeholder) relationships are not constant across
firms, but depend strongly on the particular business and
industry. Figure 1 illustrates those potential differences in
financial distress cost functions that may be due to industry-
specific or product-type characteristics. Differences in direct
bankruptcy costs are likely to be small.
In order to empirically estimate the cross-sectional differences
between firms’ financial distress cost functions, time series of
at least two proxy variables are needed: one to reflect the
changing degree of financial distress (measured, for example,
by the firm’s credit rating or, far better in terms of data avail-
ability, by its credit default swap spread5) and one for the
resulting distress costs (measured, for example, by accounting
earnings or, again far better in terms of data availability, by the
firm’s stock price). We will ignore these regression issues for
future practical application and empirical work and return to
the conceptual issue of capturing existing differences among
the firms’ distress costs. 
In order to maintain the intuition of the Merton (1973, 1974)
option pricing framework, it seems reasonable to simplify the
firm’s financial distress cost function by assuming a piecewise
linear relationship between future firm value (V) and financial
distress costs (DC). Then, with a constant-percentage financial
distress cost rate (m) for each firm, the claim by the benefici-
aries with respect to the firm’s precarious situation is given
simply by DC = m · max (D – V, 0). Here, D denotes the face
value of debt that the firm issues, so that the term D – V can
be interpreted as the firm’s distance to default or its distance
to bankruptcy that fluctuates over time. Hence, the more seri-
ous the firm’s financial distress, the higher the associated
costs. Furthermore, the higher the parameter m, the more
sensitive is the net value of the firm to adverse changes in its
perceived probability of bankruptcy. In a sense, parameter m
could be described as a kind of bankruptcy beta, since its
empirical content as a sensitivity measure of the firm’s unsys-
tematic bankruptcy risk resembles the beta coefficient that is
commonly applied to measure a firm’s systematic risk. In the
Iaccoca example cited above, a car manufacturer, such as
Chrysler, would probably be characterized by a much higher
bankruptcy beta m than a cereal producer like Kellogg’s.
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4 See also Hall’s (2002) analysis of a banking firm: “...one would intuitively expect
the cost of financial distress to curve upwards as the bank is forced into ever more
draconian action to survive.”
5 With the development of liquid credit default swap markets the availability of high-
frequency time-series data has greatly improved. Bloomberg quotes for credit
default swap spreads are now available for more than 1,500 companies. The 
relationship between credit default swap spreads, bond yields, and Moody’s credit
rating announcements is analyzed, for example, by Hull, Predescu and White
(2004).
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Figure 1 – Differences in financial distress cost functions across firms
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Borrowing at the company level is motivated by income tax
considerations. Corporate debt is assumed to create a tax
shield that serves as a counterweight to financial distress
costs [Brealey, Myers and Allen (2005)]. A marginal increase
in the debt issue reduces the present value of the govern-
ment’s tax claim. In bankruptcy, taxable income would be neg-
ative and, if there was no associated tax credit, the tax shield
of debt would be lost (at least partly). The interpretation of the
distress costs (DC) and corporate tax (CT) functions illustrated
in Figure 2, which constitute a unique optimal debt level, is
straightforward. A one dollar increase in the firm’s debt level
leads, on the one hand, to an increase in expected financial
distress costs, but on the other hand, to a reduction in expect-
ed corporate taxes. The optimal degree of leverage is reached
when the present value of expected tax relief of the last dollar
promised to the creditors just offsets the present value of the
additional distress costs caused. 
Corporate hedging benefits shareholders by
reducing financial distress costs and taxes
Let us now consider the case in which the firm’s risk manage-
ment is confronted with a capital structure that is determined
exogenously, so that only the hedge ratio is subject to opti-
mization. As explained by Brown and Toft (2002), such a situ-
ation can be justified by thinking of the firm’s capital structure
choice as a more strategic long-run decision, while its hedging
decision is more flexible and focuses on the short-run. 
In this case, both the present values of financial distress costs
and of corporate taxes are reduced by a marginal increase in
the hedge ratio, as long as the probability of bankruptcy can
be reduced further by corporate hedging. If, conversely, the
riskless payments from certain derivatives contracts already
fully cover the firm’s credit obligation (D), then a marginal
increase in the hedge ratio has no further impact on share-
holder value.
To see how this works, it is helpful to think of the government’s
tax claim (CT) as a call option with a strike price that is identi-
cal to the face value of debt (D) and with the value of the firm
(V) as its underlying [Majd and Myers (1987)]. In the same way,
the financial distress costs (DC) can be seen as a put option
which is a contingent claim owned by the firm’s competitors or
other potential beneficiaries of its distressed situation. 
A familiar finding of option pricing theory is that the market
value of any option is, in principle, an increasing function of
the risk inherent in its underlying [Merton (1973)]. As long as
the variance of the firm’s asset value can be reduced by an
increasing hedge ratio, one would expect the present value of
both external drains to shrink and, as a result, shareholder
value to increase. However, as pointed out by Jagannathan
(1984) in an article that clarifies the role of Jensen’s Inequality
in option pricing theory, this result would require strictly con-
vex payoff functions. Because the government’s and the bank-
ruptcy beneficiaries’ contingent claims lose this feature when
the firm’s hedging activity exceeds a certain threshold level,
the present values of taxes and bankruptcy costs may remain
unchanged, although the variance of the firm’s asset value
simultaneously decreases further.
Therefore, it cannot be concluded from an option-like convex-
ity of the deadweight costs (reflected either by costs of finan-
cial distress or corporate taxes) alone, that only the full hedge
is optimal. With a fixed capital structure, the hedging policies
that derive from the competing goals of shareholder value
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Figure 2 – Financial distress costs (DC) and corporate taxes (CT) constitute an
optimal degree of leverage (L*) 
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maximization and minimization of total risk (measured, for
example, by the variance) will generally differ6. Hence, taking
into account that an increased volume of derivatives contracts
typically leads to additional transaction costs, in the form of
bid-ask-spreads, for example, the recommendation for man-
agement is to reduce risk to the degree which will enable
default to be ruled out with sufficient certainty.7
Corporate hedging benefits shareholders by
raising optimal leverage
Let us consider the situation in which the firm’s financial man-
agement is confronted with a hedge ratio that is determined
exogenously, so that only the face value of the debt issuance
is subject to optimization. Consider, for example, that it is the
company’s policy, for whatever reason, that exposures must
always be fully hedged (H = 100%), hedged partly (H = 50%),
or that the company has even decided not to use any deriva-
tives at all (H = 0%). We wish to investigate briefly how a
change in the hedge ratio can create additional value for
shareholders by influencing the firm’s capital structure choice.
A marginal increase in the hedge ratio affects the optimal cap-
ital structure through both the market value of the increase in
distress costs resulting from an additional dollar borrowed and
through the market value of the tax relief derived from an
additional dollar borrowed. If the firm’s bankruptcy risk can be
reduced by a marginal increase in the hedge ratio, then this
increase renders less valuable the additional financial distress
costs that may arise in the future from an additional dollar
borrowed today. Furthermore, the additional future tax sav-
ings from an additional dollar borrowed become more valu-
able now, because future taxes are only payable to the gov-
ernment if bankruptcy does not occur. Thus, on the one hand,
corporate hedging can make the tax shield from additional
debt safer, but on the other hand, can render less safe the
claim by the beneficiaries of bankruptcy caused by further
borrowing. Hence, a marginal increase in the firm’s hedge ratio
can lead to both a shrinking present value of the bankruptcy
costs resulting from an additional dollar borrowed and at the
same time to a growing present value of the tax relief result-
ing from an additional dollar borrowed. Because the reduction
in bankruptcy risk triggered by corporate hedging makes fur-
ther debt financing more attractive, optimal leverage will be
adjusted upwards to the benefit of shareholders.
This second-order effect of corporate hedging on shareholder
value is illustrated in Figure 3. As already clear from Figure 2,
the optimal size of the debt issue constitutes an optimal
degree of leverage L* that minimizes the sum of the present
values of distress costs (DC) and corporate taxes (CT), if the
firm does not hedge at all (H = 0). The sum of deadweight
costs PV(DC+CT) that must ultimately be borne by the firm’s
shareholders is illustrated in Figure 3 as a function of leverage
(L) for three alternative hedge ratios (H) of 0%, 30%, and
60%, respectively. As the arrow indicates, optimal leverage
(L*) increases with the selected hedge ratio. Hence, both types
of undesired deadweight cost are not only diminished directly
by corporate hedging, but they can be reduced even further,
as higher hedge ratios allow the firm to raise leverage without
increasing its bankruptcy risk.
Trading off the costs and benefits of corporate
hedging: who hedges more? 
Finally, we consider the case in which the company’s manage-
ment selects both its leverage and hedge ratio simultaneous-
ly. Stulz (1996) suggest that ‘a company’s decisions to hedge
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6 The fundamental difference between hedging strategies that focus on a reduction
of total risk (i.e., cash flow variance) and those that are designed to reduce bank-
ruptcy risk is analyzed by Hahnenstein and Röder (2003).
7 The required confidence level may be derived from the firm’s target rating. This
idea is implemented in the economic capital approaches that have become an
increasingly popular risk management concept during the past few years. See, for
example, Hall (2002) or Schroeck (2002).
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Figure 3 – Combined present value of financial distress costs and corporate taxes
as a function of leverage L for alternative hedge ratios H = 0%, 30%, and 60%
(H=60%)
(H=30%)
(H=0%)
8 The idea of hedging away all risk in the first step and then levering up to a higher
debt level in order to minimize the firm’s tax liability can be attributed originally to
MacMinn (1987).
9 Stulz (1996) refers to the variance-minimization-paradigm as the “prevailing aca-
demic theory of risk management” and Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993) summa-
rize that “much of the previous work has the extreme implication that firms should
hedge fully – completely insulating their market values from hedgeable risk.”
10 As in Graham and Rogers (2002), information about differences in firms’ hedge
ratios may be derived from mandatory accounting disclosures. A potential empiri-
cal proxy variable for a firm’s hedge ratio is the net notional amount of its total
derivatives usage divided by its sales or total assets. Aggarwal and Simkins (2004)
provide a summary of US-GAAP disclosure requirements for derivative financial
instruments during the 1990s.
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financial risks [...] should be made jointly with the corporate
capital structure decision.’
We have stressed the fundamental difference between hedg-
ing strategies to reduce total risk, in terms of variance, and
downside risk, in terms of the firm’s probability of default,
when leverage is exogenous. However, these differences may
vanish in the simultaneous optimization of both corporate
decision variables. To see how this works it is important to
understand that shareholder value always increases with an
increase in the firm’s hedge ratio, when the firm is optimally
levered and when transaction costs deriving from corporate
hedging can be ignored. Hence, it is an immediate conse-
quence that in the simultaneous optimum the firm fully
hedges all its market price risk (H* = 100%).8
This intermediate finding based on neglecting the potential
costs of corporate hedging is illustrated in Figure 4, which
depicts the contour curves of the shareholder value surface. 
In particular, it becomes apparent that total shareholder
wealth always increases with the firm’s hedge ratio for an opti-
mized capital structure. Although shareholder value does not
always increase with the firm’s hedge ratio (the iso-sharehold-
er-value-ellipses are vertical in the upper left corner of the
base), it does so if further hedging reduces the bankruptcy risk
incurred when leverage is optimal.
Corporate hedging, which Stulz (1996) has characterized as a
substitute for equity, is, in a sense, simply a means of applying
regulatory arbitrage. The risk of future market price fluctua-
tions is transferred completely to the hedge counterparty, who
as the seller of protection effectively assumes the risk profile
of an equity investor in the firm. Of course, this risk transfer
will only take place if the counterparty’s marginal costs of
financial distress and taxes, which depend on the cash flows of
all its other assets as well, are lower than those of the firm,
possibly because it needs the firm’s products as an input fac-
tor. Therefore, in equilibrium, the allocation of risk across the
economy through equity, bond, and derivatives markets mini-
mizes the total deadweight loss imposed by the legal, regula-
tory framework. Interestingly, this line of reasoning leads to an
optimal hedging policy for the firm that coincides with the
variance-minimizing solution that emerges from conventional
wisdom9.
While our analysis has so far been restricted to the benefits of
corporate hedging and their interrelatedness, we now try to
explain observable cross-sectional differences in corporate
hedging behavior that result from trading off the benefits and
costs of corporate hedging10. In order to establish an empiri-
cally testable theory of corporate hedging we introduce into
our framework transaction costs of hedging (TC) that are
assumed to directly diminish shareholder wealth. These trans-
action costs offset the benefits derived from reduced taxes,
lower distress costs, and higher leverage and can thereby con-
stitute a unique optimal hedge ratio. It can be shown that at
the simultaneous optimum of both the firm’s hedging and
leverage variables, several comparative static results hold
unambiguously for the chosen hedge ratio.
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The first finding that emerges from the analysis is that those
firms that face lower marginal transaction costs of corporate
hedging are more likely either to hedge in full or in part. A
second, not surprising finding is that those firms that are
exposed to more volatile operating cash flows derive greater
benefits from corporate hedging. The real reason behind this
result is as follows. A greater level of price volatility in the
firm’s operating income renders the deadweight options for
the beneficiaries of bankruptcy and of government’s tax
claim more valuable. Because the firm chooses its capital
structure such that there is always a positive probability of
bankruptcy, an increase in cash flow volatility leads to an
increase in the marginal benefit that shareholders derive
from corporate hedging. This is the case because the reduc-
tion in market value of both the external put and call options
achieved through a derivates contract is ceteris paribus high-
er. Our third, and most important, comparative static result is
that those firms whose indirect bankruptcy cost functions
react more sensitively with an increasing degree of financial
distress derive greater benefits from hedging. In terms of
option pricing theory, firms that have higher bankruptcy
betas are characterized by more convex distress cost func-
tions. Returning to the Chrysler vs. Kellogg’s example dis-
cussed above, Figure 5 illustrates why the typical automotive
manufacturing company should hedge more than the aver-
age cornflakes producer. As our hypothetical company’s
bankruptcy beta (m) rises from 25% to 30%, its optimal
hedge ratio more than doubles from 17.2% to 35.2%, while
the face value of its optimal level of outstanding debt is
reduced simultaneously by only less than 1%. 
Conclusion
In this article, we have demonstrated how the popular trade-
off model of optimal leverage that minimizes the sum of cor-
porate taxes and financial distress costs can be enriched with
the derivatives market. In this market, the firm can eliminate
the market price risk associated with its operations by means
of hedging contracts. It was demonstrated that the optimal
level of outstanding debt is raised by an increase in the hedge
ratio, if the probability of the firm going bankrupt is reduced.
We have illustrated that, for a given capital structure, the
market value of shareholder equity is an increasing function
of the firm’s hedge ratio. This influence is, in terms of option
pricing theory, due to the convexity of the deadweight claim
payoff profiles. Interestingly, it cannot be concluded from the
convexity of deadweight costs, in conjunction with a fixed
capital structure, that the full hedge is the only optimal solu-
tion, because this convexity may disappear when bankruptcy
risk is reduced. However, it is evident that for an optimally
leveraged firm the marginal benefit shareholders derive from
corporate hedging is always positive in the absence of trans-
action costs of hedging. Consequently, the firm insulates its
future payments completely from hedgeable risk in the simul-
taneous optimum of its hedge ratio and capital structure. This
intermediate result sheds new light on minimizing the vari-
ance of future cash flows as an appropriate goal for corpo-
rate risk management, when transaction costs of hedging are
negligible.
Finally, and most importantly, however, when transaction costs
of corporate hedging are taken into account that can offset
the benefits, it emerges that in a group of otherwise identical
optimally leveraged firms, those firms that face lower margin-
al transaction costs of hedging, more volatile operating cash
flows and, in particular, more convex deadweight costs should
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Figure 5 – Impact of increasing sensitivity m in the firm’s financial distress cost
function on the joint optimum of its hedge ratio H* and leverage L*.
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choose higher hedge ratios. While the convexity of the firm’s
effective tax function, which is due to non-linearity of the
national tax codes, has already been discussed extensively in
prior empirical research [Graham and Smith (1999) and
Graham and Rogers (2002)], the convexity of deadweight
costs due to potential financial distress, which plays the cen-
tral role in our model here, has been neglected completely.
Using anecdotal evidence of greater benefits of risk manage-
ment for firms selling credence goods or products involving
long-term relationships, we believe that such differences in
indirect bankruptcy cost functions across firms offer a prom-
ising basis for future empirical research aimed at explaining
observable differences in firms’ hedge ratios.
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